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I was compelled to listen to the jokesters.
— Demeter Proudfoot in Kroetsch’s The Studhorse Man (149)
In the life-game of postmodern consumers the rules of the game 
keep changing in the course of playing. 
  — Zygmunt Bauman Life in Fragments: Essays on Postmodern
       Morality (89)
I am on the side of game critics. 
  — Robert Kroetsch Labyrinths of Voice (72)
obert Kroetsch’s writing is so expertly polysemous that it 
should come as little surprise that his depictions of play have 
been interpreted through a wide range of critical paradigms. 
Extant criticism of his novels and poetry has considered notions of play 
as instances of the postmodern play of the signifier, the carnivalesque, 
and Kristevan notions of excess (to name only a few interpretations).1 
Yet perhaps it is this very polysemous nature of Kroetsch’s writing, and 
his ceaseless juggling of the multiple signifiers of nation, history, desire, 
language, the body, and sex, that have led critics to focus singularly on 
his attention to play rather than his stated interest in “the literal use of 
game in daily life” (Labyrinths 49). Kroetsch’s work includes numerous 
references to games, sports, jokes, riddles, and parodic rituals. Games 
are ubiquitous and ongoing in Kroetsch’s work and they function both 
as metaphors for acts of signification and as mechanisms for narrating 
a social order that is increasingly organized according to the logic of 
the game.
Kroetsch’s poetic sensibilities enable the distinction between game 
and play to remain blurry, marked by a postmodern notion of a “double 
thing.” He describes how “there is a double thing that goes on. . . . 
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The two words contradict each other in a signifying way. Play resists 
the necessary rules of the game” (Labyrinths 50). Kroetsch suggests 
that game occupies the disciplinary end of a binary that play is forever 
resisting. Yet, as with all things Kroetschian, the binaries do not hold, 
and games, in Kroetsch’s work, become more than merely a “neces-
sary” set of rules for the player to subvert. Games offer metaphors for 
the social order; they are spaces in which social mores are satirized and 
received binaries are inverted. Furthermore, by breaking out of their 
designated spaces, Kroetsch’s games are also a mechanism for subverting 
the broader social order. This latter sense of gaming, as a mechanism 
for not merely depicting but also subverting the social order, is specific-
ally informed by Kroetsch’s interest in game theory and game studies. 
In what follows I trace the importance of games through Kroetsch’s 
work, particularly as they inf lect this “double thing” that structures 
Kroetsch’s aesthetics more generally. With a specific focus on What the 
Crow Said and The Studhorse Man, I argue that Kroetsch’s texts depict 
the confluence of “gamespace” (Wark 001) and social space to suggest 
that the rules of gaming can transform allegedly serious conceptions of 
identity, language, gender, and nation. Kroetsch thus extends the logic 
of gamespace to broader social spheres to reveal how language, identity, 
and nation are themselves games open to creative acts of subversion.
One of Kroetsch’s earliest discussions of the importance of games 
and game theory in his work is in Labyrinths of Voice (1982), a book-
length interview between Kroetsch, Shirley C. Neuman, and Robert 
Rawdon Wilson. The second section, entitled “Game,” focuses on 
the importance of games in Kroetsch’s fiction, poetry, and criticism. 
Kroetsch explains,
Years ago I read Homo Ludens and that influenced me. Though it’s 
a pretty conservative theory. . . . I was interested in the literal use of 
game in daily life. In a small town, in a rural area where card play-
ing especially is very central, I was influenced by the old women 
in the community who would read cards. I had two aunts who on 
occasion would read cards . . . with an ambiguous sense that it was 
just playing but at the same time that it was serious. That ambigu-
ity intrigued me to no end. I think that even in the most elaborate 
games, like religion, there is that double sense. The notion of neces-
sary fiction really relates to that, doesn’t it? (49-50)
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Kroetsch refers to Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens (1931), perhaps the 
first book-length study of the social function of games and arguably the 
foundational game studies text. Kroetsch’s work accords with Huizinga’s 
central thesis that “in the absence of the play-spirit civilization is impos-
sible” (101), yet for Kroetsch the “play-spirit” of gaming produces a 
“double sense,” particularly evident in “the most elaborate games, like 
religion.” The doubleness of games refers to the capacity of play to sub-
vert and transform the rules of the game as well as the capacity of the 
gaming to transform other forms of sociality, such that the games of 
the “old women in the community who would read cards” undermines 
the authority of “elaborate games, like religion.” This doubleness gen-
erates the “ambiguity” between explicit gaming acts and the “serious” 
world; this ambiguity leads Kroetsch to identify Huizinga’s theory as 
too conservative for his notion of gaming. Huizinga argues that games 
occur in the social space of a “magic circle” where the acceptable rules of 
society do not apply, allowing for an exceptional space where taboo and 
carnivalesque expressions and behaviours are permitted. For Kroetsch, 
however, the transformation of identity and signification within the 
game extends beyond gamespace, dispersing this “play-spirit” into other 
forms of sociality and thus rendering the difference between game and 
the broader social sphere deeply ambiguous.
Game theory emerged out of mathematics and economics depart-
ments in the early 1950s, particularly in the work of John Forbes Nash 
Jr., John Von Neumann, and Robert McNamara. It offers a mathemat-
ical supplement to the sociological game studies work of Huizinga and 
others; Rubinstein defines game theory as the “analysis of the concepts 
used in social reasoning when dealing with situations of conflict” and 
“an abstract inquiry into the function and logic of social institutions and 
patterns of behavior” (909). Game theorists have critiqued Huizinga’s 
magic circle, particularly as game theory is seen as an increasingly rel-
evant model for understanding a wide variety of social relationships. 
They challenge “Huizinga’s famous account of play as a quasi-sacred 
‘autotelic’ activity, conducted purely for its own sake, in a space and 
time ritually segregated from everyday life” (Dyer-Witherford and de 
Peuter xxxiv), arguing instead that the logic of gaming extends well 
beyond the space of the game. The inherently competitive relation-
ship between actors in a variety of forms (citing such diverse examples 
as stock trading, the Cuban missile crisis, evolution, and healthcare) 
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enables game theory to effectively model the interests and behaviours of 
diverse actors and scenarios.2 Thomas Lemke’s argument that “neoliber-
alism encourages individuals to give their lives a specific entrepreneurial 
form” (202), like Henry Giroux’s analysis of neoliberalism as having 
“heralded a radical economic, political, and experiential shift that now 
largely defines the citizen as a consumer” (“Neoliberalism”), indicates 
the manner in which contemporary subjectivity can be increasingly 
conceived of in the terms of economic and competitive game theory: as 
self-optimizing agents or homo economicus.3 Where Lemke, Giroux, and 
others lament the neoliberal transformation of all social relationships 
into forms of competition, strategy, and profit-maximization, game 
theorists have heralded the emergence of these rational, strategic, and 
predictable forms as they are particularly suited to the analytic strengths 
of game theory and game studies. 
The expansion of game theory’s purview has resulted in some appli-
cation of game theory to topics in the humanities, and specifically lit-
erary texts.4 Yet this confluence between game theory, game studies, 
and literary analysis remains inadequately theorized from either a game 
theory or digital humanities perspective. Steven J. Brams’s Game Theory 
and the Humanities (2011) suggests the fertile grounds for analysis that 
arise out of applications of game theory to narrative. He argues that 
game theory offers a “a structure for clarifying strategic issues in plot 
design and character development that literary theories often ignore” 
(3-4) and that “game theory helps one unravel the mystery, at least 
in literary works in which there is a plot and the characters indicate 
reasons for acting the way they do” (5). Brams usefully applies game 
theory concepts such as the Nash equilibrium and Theory of Moves to 
tragedies, Biblical narratives, and other texts. Despite the strength of 
Brams’s argument, his analysis remains strictly at the plot level as he 
attempts to understand the actions of characters according to possible 
strategic outcomes. Furthermore, he completely ignores narrative ambi-
guity, does not combine game theory with meaningful close reading, 
and cannot account for the relationship between narrative and form 
and the means by which genre and other formal elements transform 
the models he applies.5 His reliance on verisimilitude and unexamined 
notions of realism leads him to conclude that “plotless or surrealistic 
works, while they may have aesthetic appeal, are least amenable to this 
kind of analysis” (5).
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I disagree that plotless, surrealist, or postmodern texts are ill-suited 
to literary analysis informed by game theory. There is a productive and 
revealing relationship between the postmodern play of the signifier and 
the elements of play, gaming, and strategy in a number of texts, includ-
ing some that Brams cites. Additionally, postmodern texts both the-
matize the relationship between games and meaning and identify the 
increasing importance of games as heuristic models under the conditions 
of postmodernity. As such, Kroetsch’s work offers an exemplary case for 
the application of game theory to texts, not only in his explicit depiction 
of gaming as metaphor but also in the relationship between games and 
the transformation of signification, place, and identity within postmod-
ernism. Kroetsch’s depiction of games merits detailed attention because 
his work depicts the manner in which games escape Huizinga’s magic 
circle and subverts the meaning of serious labour and identity. His texts 
offer a rejoinder to game theorists who see play as mere strategy rather 
than a transformation of the rules of the game itself while also demand-
ing that literary critics attend to postmodern play and games in all their 
forms. 
In Labyrinths of Voice, Kroetsch outlines his critical interest in gam-
ing and its relationship to language and narrative. He explains, “Game 
theory is the conception of language as a serious game, picture theory of lan-
guage as identical with reality. Now I think at various times in literature, 
we’ve emphasized one or the other. . . . In our own time there’s been this tre-
mendous move to language as game” (73). Kroetsch invokes Wittgenstein’s 
vocabulary of a picture theory of language, which he opposes to “the 
conception of language as a serious game”; in doing so he blurs the dis-
tinctions between Huizinga’s game theory and Wittgenstein’s language 
games.6 Yet Kroetsch is perhaps more interested in the spirit of both 
Wittgenstein’s and Huizinga’s conceptions of games, particularly their 
capacity for subverting and playing with identity and meaning, than in 
their precise ideas of what constitutes a game.7 While the specific man-
ner in which Kroetsch takes up Wittgenstein’s work is beyond the scope 
of this essay, his interest in language games suggests that he conceives 
of language as a set of rules open to acts of creative subversion — a 
conception reflected both in his own language games and in the explicit 
depictions of gaming in his work. Kroetsch’s notion of game theory 
challenges the mimetic relation between reality and language and is a 
suitable metaphor for narrative that replaces the “picture theory of lan-
Robert Kroetsch 99
guage.” Further, games offer Kroetsch an appropriate metaphor for the 
conditions of postmodern writing, with the positions of the author and 
reader played in a strategic and dialogic game of meaning. Yet games are 
not just metaphors but also effect a broader transformation of broader 
institutions and social spheres in Kroetsch’s work. 
In making the link between writing and games, Kroetsch draws on 
John Fowles’s notion of a godgame (Fowles’s original title for The Magus 
[1966]), which Wilson describes as “a game-like situation in which a 
magister ludi knows the rules . . . and the player does not. The term 
godgame may be extended to include all instances of a certain kind of 
literary illusion . . . which a victim within a confusing, shifting web of 
incidents attempts to think his way out or through (that is, discover the 
rules)” (Labyrinths 67-68). Fowles’s The Magus provides a prototype for 
the godgame as a narrative form, particularly as Maurice Conchis enacts 
a series of increasingly bizarre trials, plays, psychological tests, theatri-
cal performances, and life-threatening challenges upon Nicholas Urfe. 
As Conchis’s godgame unfolds, Urfe is increasingly unable to separate 
reality from performance, identity from mask, and history from fiction. 
Kroetsch’s interest in Fowles’s godgame leads to his deciding “upon 
this analogy: The action of the literary work takes place in a definite 
field; let the types and masks, the cast of the contemporary theater, 
correspond to chess figures. Plots will correspond to gambits, i.e., to 
the classic options, variations of which are played by the players. The 
tasks . . . correspond to the opponent’s moves” (81). Kroetsch’s games 
are not merely metaphors for language and the struggle for meaning; 
he also conceives of fiction as a game where the structure of the nar-
rative constitutes a field of play and the quest corresponds to a series 
of moves. Furthermore, Kroetsch recasts Fowles’s godgame under the 
conditions of postmodernity, removing the all-knowing Magus and 
leaving only the game. There is no escape from Kroetsch’s godgames, 
but rather it is in playing the game that meaning is generated. Indeed 
much of Krotesch’s work can be described as a postmodern game in 
which reader and character attempt to discover the rules of a “shifting 
web of incidents” and the author looms as an absentee game master.
Kroetsch’s games include, but are not limited to, games of significa-
tions and the godgame of the subject attempting to discover the rules 
of the text. He argues that games necessarily raise “one of the functions 
of art: to put us into situations where we apprehend the rules only up to 
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a point. . . . We are all in games where we can’t quite perceive the rules. 
We are in the godgame situation” (Labyrinths 68). Kroetsch’s narra-
tives generate a “possibility space,” wherein, according to Ian Bogost, 
readers “explore the possibility space its rules afford by manipulating 
the symbolic systems the game provides. The rules do not merely create 
the experience of play — they also construct the meaning of the game” 
(121). If gaming is an appropriate metaphor for the struggle for meaning 
in Kroetsch’s work, this metaphor undergoes a postmodern inversion 
such that the vehicle transcends its function within the metaphor, occu-
pying the space of the tenor. One plays Kroetsch’s games simply to play 
and not for some concluding revelation or illumination. He explains, 
“Games are so much a part of life that when the critics turn them into 
the sum total of literature, they are missing part of the game. . . . They 
are getting out of the game by claiming too much . . . part of the game 
is the connection between model and the raw material of life” (83). 
Kroetsch admonishes critics who miss the game, conceiving of it as just 
“the sum total of literature” rather than recognizing “the literal use of 
game in daily life” (49). He calls on critics not merely to engage in the 
godgame of the text but also to recognize the importance of playing the 
game itself in a manner that shifts the relationship between the game 
and other social spheres.
Perhaps the clearest relationship between the godgame of the text, 
the explicit act of gaming, and the transformation of the social sphere 
according to the conditions of the game occurs in Kroetsch’s What the 
Crow Said, in the 151-day-long game of schmier played by the men of 
Bigknife, Saskatchewan. Beginning as casual recreation on a Sunday 
afternoon, the game extends over many months and moves from Tiddy 
Lang’s kitchen into numerous sheds, shacks, moving vehicles, and 
church basements. In a novel concerned with the limits of language, 
the trouble with meaning and silence within postmodernism, and the 
desire to name and be named, the schmier game provides a metaphor 
for these struggles for representation while simultaneously transforming 
the structures of meaning outside the game. Liebhaber first recognizes 
“the seriousness of their game” (What the Crow Said 93) when Old Lady 
Lang interprets their cards: 
Old Lady Lang looked and shook her head, ‘Ach ja.’ The men . . . 
looked anew at the worn cards, at the worn numbers, the worn pic-
tures. They had never seen their cards in quite that way before. . . . 
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They knew, those men, studying their cards in the presence of Old 
Lady Lang, they knew there was no meaning anywhere in the world. 
(94) 
If we believe Kroetsch when he says, “I take a card game very seriously. 
For me, a card game is a model of life” (64), then the meaninglessness 
of the card game reflects a broader condition of meaninglessness in the 
world. Yet, the card game is not merely a “model of life” but also a mech-
anism by which Kroetsch transforms the conditions of making meaning 
in the spaces outside the game. Old Lady Lang’s revelation, that “there 
was no meaning anywhere in the world,” recalls Wittgenstein’s critique 
of the picture theory of language, particularly its insistence that “every 
word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the 
object for which the word stands” (2). If the picture theory of language 
asserts a correlation between meaning and word, Wittgenstein’s lan-
guage games illuminate the revelation of the schmier game: “there was 
no meaning anywhere in the world.” Yet within these conditions, the 
men must decide how to play the game: do they live in a world wholly 
devoid of meaning, or do they live in a world in which meaning does 
not reside but must be actively produced? If, as David G. Stern argues, 
a “key paradox that occurs over and over again . . . throughout the first 
two hundred sections of the Philosophical Investigations is that nothing 
is intrinsically meaningful, for all determination of meaning, by such 
means as definitions, rules, thoughts, or images, is dependent on inter-
pretation” (20), then the schmier game does not reveal the absence of 
meaning as such but rather stresses the manner by which meaning is 
produced through the act of playing the game.
Old Lady Lang’s revelation contradicts Kathleen Wall’s argument 
that the ongoing schmier game in the novel offers a stable set of rules 
and predictable results in an otherwise unstable and seemingly ran-
dom world. Wall argues that the game indicates “the lengths to which 
Liebhaber and his crew will go in order to confine themselves to a 
microcosm that has definable rules. . . . Playing schmier, the men separ-
ate themselves from the world they cannot control. . . . Moreover, the 
rules of the game structure their lives in a way the rules of the godgame 
. . . cannot” (96). Perhaps the game begins that way, but its vast dur-
ation, the devotion that the men dedicate to continuing to play, and 
the physical and emotional toll that the game takes on them all suggest 
that the order offered by the game becomes wildly bent and exagger-
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ated. The revelation of the game, that “there was no meaning anywhere 
in the world,” inverts Wall’s argument such that the arbitrary rules of 
schmier extend outside the space of the game to undermine meaning 
in the broader social sphere. As with Skandl’s lighthouse, which failed 
to deliver its promised affluence or impose a patriarchal order onto the 
chaotic space of Bigknife, the schmier game does not provide a separate 
space where rules and meaning are known but rather reflects back the 
postmodern godgame the men thought they had escaped.
This extension of gamespace into other forms of sociality is evident 
later in the novel when the schmier game moves into the basement of 
the church. Father Basil’s statement that “God is our jailer” (105) echoes 
the postmodern godgame yet also takes on separate meanings for the 
congregation upstairs and the schmier game below. Basil’s sermon con-
cludes as follows: 
“In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” 
The effect in the basement was uncanny. Liebhaber, at that instant, 
for the first time in his life, cheated at cards. He withheld an ace 
and Marvin Straw, finally, counted two points. . . . A couple of 
the men at the table had noticed Liebhaber’s gesture: and they too 
began to understand. A man’s life was at stake. (105-06)
The “uncanny” relation between the game in the basement and the 
sermon above is extended when Father Basil joins the game and the 
thirteen players positioned around the table connote an inverted Last 
Supper. The life that is at stake in the game of cards is that of Jerry 
Lapanne, who is to be executed by Marvin Straw in three days. The 
men thus conspire to keep Straw in the game so long that he misses 
the execution, thus saving Lapanne’s life. It is paradoxically in a world 
in which “there was no meaning” that the game becomes the site of 
religious parody, meaningful struggle, and serious play. If the symbolic 
system of the schmier game contains no meaning, then it is the act 
of playing, of continuing the game, that provides meaning and ren-
ders the game serious. Where the schmier game is played in a barn 
which reeks of “the stench of death” and in which “the carcass of a dead 
horse stank to high heaven” (98), the men’s continuous playing to save 
Straw’s life becomes a form of salvation from the lack of meaning in the 
world. Therefore, where Wall sees games in the novel as “antidotes or 
relief from the godgame” and the world of unstable meaning, I argue 
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that Kroetsch posits a continuity between the possibility space of the 
card game and the godgame. The game of schmier does not offer res-
pite from a social godgame where rules and meaning are unstable but, 
instead, shows that meaning emerges from the continuous playing. Yet 
the game is not singularly a metaphor for life under postmodernism but 
also thematizes the transformation of life itself into a kind of game. In 
order to save Lapanne, the men must continue to play, and within the 
collapsing binary of play and seriousness, “They were playing to win, 
and to win they had to lose” (108). 
Kroetsch’s attention to ongoing games and the extension of 
gamespace into other social spheres differentiates his conception of 
games from Bakhtin’s. Certainly, his depiction of jokes, feasts, bawdy 
humour, and bodily excretions in What the Crow Said draw on Bakhtin’s 
analysis of the carnivalesque in Rabelais’s work.8 Kroetsch repeatedly 
draws on Bakhtin’s analysis of Medieval and Renaissance folk cultures in 
their explicit depictions of violence, carnival, jokes, and the body to offer 
his own notion of “grotesque realism” (Bakhtin 18). The schmier players, 
for instance, are described as having “pissed themselves; two, unasham-
edly, shat their pants. . . . The smell of urine and excrement . . . hung in 
the streets of Big Indian throughout the entire day” (113). Descriptions 
such as these pervade Kroetsch’s novels, and this bodily and grotesque 
realism is integral to Kroetsch’s playing with the relationship between 
the body, language, and desire. In both Kroetsch’s work and Bakhtin’s 
analysis, this grotesque realism is deeply “ambivalent”: both “humiliat-
ing and mortifying” and reviving and renewing. This ambivalent gro-
tesque realism gives rise to a “pathos of change and renewal, with the 
sense of the gay relativity of prevailing truths and authorities. We find 
here a characteristic logic, the peculiar logic of the ‘inside out,’ of the 
‘turnabout,’ of a continual shifting from top to bottom, from front to 
rear” (Bakhtin 11). Kroetsch’s interest in the “double thing,” of collaps-
ing binaries or holding opposite ends of binaries in tension with one 
another gives voice to, in Bakhtin’s words, the “second life, a second 
world of folk culture” (11) and “this double aspect of the world and of 
human life” (6).9 
A Bakhtinian reading of Kroetsch’s work is compelling in a number of 
ways, particularly as it provides a framework for understanding Kroetsch’s 
efforts to unite “the positive and negative poles of becoming (death-birth)” 
(Bakhtin 150). Yet, there are limitations to the Bakhtinian interpretation, 
104 Scl/Élc
particularly as critics have tended to interpret all of Kroetsch’s games, 
jokes, pranks, tricks, festivals, celebrations, parodies, and bawdy moments 
as instances of the carnivalesque. Bakhtin is only partially useful in 
explaining Kroetsch’s interest in games, as games in Kroetsch’s work are 
not always instances of the carnivalesque or grotesque realism. Randall 
is correct, for instance, in identifying how Kroetsch uses festive laughter 
to give voice to the intertextual quality of his work. However, he extends 
his argument, suggesting that the game of schmier is situated between 
two feasts, and therefore locates the game within Bakhtin’s carnivalesque. 
Yet the first would-be feast, the Sunday dinner at Tiddy Lang’s house, 
never happens precisely because of the game, and the second feast marks 
the conclusion of the game. While the game of schmier is bookended by 
two potential feasts, the game is not enabled by, nor is it an element of, 
the feast in Bakhtin’s sense,10 and thus Kroetsch’s games inscribe a differ-
ent space than that discussed in Bakhtin’s work. Bakhtin’s games occur 
in a prescribed space of the carnival or feast whereas Kroetsch’s games 
are ubiquitous and, in their ongoing form, transform the social spaces 
that attempt to circumscribe them. Bakhtin argues that “games drew 
the players out of the bounds of everyday life, liberated from usual laws 
and regulations” (235) and that “games are extra-official . . . governed by 
rules contrary to the current laws of life” (259-60). As with Huizinga’s 
magic circle, this conception of the game occurring within the space of 
the feast, and thereby isolated from “usual laws and regulations,” is too 
“conservative” for Kroetsch’s depictions of games. The schmier game 
in What the Crow Said exceeds the prescribed boundaries of the game 
and transforms the institutions that attempt to control it. Religion, the 
family, birth, and death are all parodied and interrupted by the ceaseless 
game. Bakhtin argues that “images of games were seen as a condensed 
formula of life and of the historic process” (235). Kroetsch, however, treats 
games not merely as metaphors or images, but as elements of life. Thus, 
while Bakhtin’s work provides a convincing theoretical framework for 
interpreting Kroetsch’s attention to jokes, the body, feasts, and carnival, 
Kroetsch differs from both Bakhtin’s and Huizinga’s understanding of the 
social import of games, particularly as Kroetsch’s games exceed the pre-
scribed spaces of the feast or the magic circle. His work thus predicts the 
observation of McKenzie Wark and other game theorists who argue that 
the “atopian arena” of “gamespace” (Wark 001) has become ubiquitous, 
transforming other social structures.
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It is in The Studhorse Man (1970) that Kroetsch most explicitly 
depicts the erosion of the division between the possibility space of the 
game and the broader social sphere. Robert Lecker stresses that, along 
with Gone Indian, The Studhorse Man marks “a watershed in Kroetsch’s 
development as a novelist,” singling out his 
growing preoccupation with postmodern thought, by the intensi-
fication of his struggle with history, by his increased concentration 
on the tensions between mimetic and expressive theory, and by his 
movement toward more complex patterns of inversion and paradox 
designed to undermine traditional notions of causality, narrative 
presentation, and closure. (47)
This heightened attention to the ontological and aesthetic concerns of 
postmodernism is also manifested in Kroetsch’s attention to games. 
The opening section of the novel reads like instructions for Hazard 
Lepage’s quest: “Hazard had to get hold of a mare. . . . He was a des-
perate man. Extinction or survival” (Studhorse 7). As in the schmier 
game, the conditions of Hazard’s quest have “serious” implications of 
life and death. Further, Hazard’s very name suggests the ongoing forms 
of risk and strategy that he must engage in to accomplish his goal of 
breeding his horse, Poseidon. Hazard’s name also connotes the god-
game of The Magus as Conchis repeatedly tells Urfe that “everything, 
including you, including me, and all the gods, is a matter of hazard. 
Nothing else. Pure hazard” (185-86). If Hazard LePage’s name evokes 
Conchis’s philosophy of hazard, randomness, and chance, then the plot 
of The Studhorse Man can be conceived of as a multi-tiered godgame 
in which Hazard’s goal is to breed Poseidon, Demeter’s goal is to nar-
rate Hazard’s life, and Martha’s goal is to marry. While these positions 
shift and there are multiple sub-games within the narrative, Demeter 
and Hazard are opponents somewhat akin to Conchis and Urfe within 
the narrative-as-game metaphor. Their position as opponents within a 
godgame of meaning is evinced by the fact that the simplest path for 
Hazard’s accomplishment of his goal results in Demeter’s failure. If 
the lifeblood of Demeter’s narrative project is the numerous diversions 
and obstacles that Hazard encounters, then Hazard’s success results in 
Demeter’s failure. Demeter, like the reader, “is going on an adventure by 
reading the book” (Labyrinths 54), and, as Hazard explains, “a perpet-
ual game was in progress” (Studhorse 45). Thus, the meaning of the god-
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game is emerging from the process of playing rather than its conclusion. 
If we “are all in games where we can’t quite perceive the rules,” then it 
is not that there is “no meaning anywhere in the world,” but rather that 
the desire to play the game and to comprehend the rules generates its 
own meaning. The absence of rules does not render the game of mean-
ing unplayable or meaningless but instead it is the desire to play that 
generates meaning.11 As Kroetsch explains, “One of the curious things 
about desire is that it is often based on an absence” (Hancock 35-36). 
The absence of rules, of a mare, of meaning, of Hazard as a biographical 
presence, and of an appropriate language for writing the prairies all give 
meaning to the desire to continue playing the ongoing godgame.
In addition to these structural elements of gaming, The Studhorse 
Man includes a number of implicit12 and explicit references to gaming. 
The most explicit reference to gaming is the “perpetual game” of rummy 
that occurs “in the furnace room of the Home for Incurables, run by the 
Sisters of Temperance” (45). The hellish location of the game, played by 
religious figures and incurables alike at a five-sided table, suggests again 
the religious parodying at work. Furthermore, Sister Raphael explicitly 
links, via the logic of the game, the five players at the five-sided “pent-
agonal” table to the “five vowels” of language. As in What the Crow 
Said, the ongoing card game blurs the distinction between the play of 
the game and the “serious” games of language and religion; yet, in this 
card game, the play of probabilities, chance, and rules is undermined 
by the fact that Hazard wins every hand. Where Liebhaber must lose 
to win, Hazard’s endless winning is a form of losing that undermines 
the game. Hazard berates fellow player Torbay for his inability to play: 
“You don’t even try to win, Torbay. You pick up the wrong card. You 
throw cards away I need. Damn it, man, this isn’t a game at all. I haven’t 
got a chance. I haven’t got a ghost of a chance” (48). He complains that 
“all he had to do was go on winning and winning and winning” (53), 
a situation that results in “straight stinking boredom. Win win win 
win win. I’m human too, you know” (54). Is Hazard in the position of 
Marvin Straw, being allowed to win in order to be kept in the game, 
or is he simply a loser whose endless winning undermines the pleasure 
of the game, robbing it of the desire and process that give it meaning? 
Hazard does not play to win but rather to play, just as Kroetsch does 
not write to conclude or to arrive at meaning but to “Begin,” “Begin 
again” (“Play and Entrance” 117), and “constantly . . . experience the 
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need to begin.” (“Fear” 54). For Hazard, as for Kroetsch, winning robs 
the game of its energy to generate meaning in process, and it is in the 
act of playing, rather than winning, that the meaning of the game is 
established. Kroetsch explains: 
Hazard gets into a problem. They want him to win all the time which 
. . . destroys the game, doesn’t it? It would destroy life too. . . . Hazard 
has to play both to lose and to win. . . . A serious writer who can 
always win is bored and boring just as it was boring for Hazard to 
win in that rummy game. We push to a point where we risk losing. 
(Labyrinths 50)
Thus, Hazard’s repetitive complaint of “winning” recalls Kroetsch’s 
own repetition of “The writing the writing the writing” (“Continuing 
Poem” 82). For Kroetsch, these ongoing games offer a metaphor for “the 
writing” and the need to “Begin again.” Yet Kroetsch’s interest in the 
paradox of winning by losing and losing by winning evokes his ongoing 
drive to occupy the precarious and contradictory position of the player 
in the postmodern godgame. Lecker argues that “deferring closure . . . 
is not only to embrace desire but also to assert a political and aesthetic 
subversion of any finite system or syntactical end” (15). The game pro-
vides a suitable metaphor and mechanism for this subversion, enabling 
Hazard and Kroetsch to defer closure and to continue the process of 
generating meaning. 
References to ongoing gaming that defers closure pervade Kroetsch’s 
work. In Gone Indian (1973), for instance, Jeremy Sadness is fixated on 
the Jack Shadbolt painting “Bush Pilot in the Northern Sky” (1962), and 
his repeated description of the painting as “labyrinthine” (11) suggests 
again that structures of gaming are not restricted within gamespace 
but are palimpsestically layered onto the text and the broader social 
godgame.13 The labyrinthine image of the painting recalls the games 
that Hazard and Liebhaber play and aligns with the speaker’s statement 
in “Letters to Salonika” that “In Greece I found a maze and stories 
of mazes that became, / I now see, metonymous with my own life” 
(146). The speaker’s conception of the maze as a metonym for life both 
indicates the ubiquity of gamespace in Kroetsch’s work and conceives 
of the poetic act itself as akin to navigating a maze. Kroetsch’s use of 
mazes, labyrinths, and other games foregrounds the “primacy of the 
forthcoming and as yet unmade discovery” (“For Play” 93) in both the 
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act of writing long poetry and the ongoing game. This recurs, in a dif-
ferent form, in Kroetsch’s The Sad Phoenician, where the “and / but” 
structure of the long poem offers a formal kind of labyrinth whereby the 
speaker avoids closure and keeps the game of meaning from ending.14 
This structure offers multiple paths for the reader to follow and thus 
locates the ongoing game at the structural level of the poem. 
If Kroetsch criticism has heretofore focused on history as archae-
ology and text as palimpsest, conceiving of narrative as a game fore-
grounds the agency in the play of the writer and reader, constructing 
meaning in process. If “archaeology allows for discontinuity . . . for 
layering . . . for imaginative speculation” (“Alberta” 76), Kroetsch’s 
ongoing gaming supplements that layering to demonstrate the writer’s 
struggle to understand the rules that constrain his project as well as the 
“guesswork, juxtaposition, flashes of insight” (“Play” 93) of writer and 
reader at play. Kroetsch explains, “I want the reader to be engaged with 
me in fiction making. . . . I like that sense of process being fluid and 
open” (Kizuk 63). Lecker confirms Kroetsch’s efforts “to combat the 
stasis of product” (Hutcheon 171), arguing that in order “to ‘enter into 
the process’ the reader must, like Kroetsch, become a borderman dodg-
ing through a hall of mirrors” (12). Thus, conceiving of text, writing, 
and reading as types of gaming stresses the agency of writer and reader 
playing together in the process of generating meaning.
Games are exemplary forms of postmodern representation and, in 
Kroetsch’s work, offer a cogent writing of identity and place that resists 
closure and finitude but call on writers and readers alike to keep the 
game going. Games as metaphor and mechanism for meaning are an 
effective means of conceiving of narrative in a country that is caught 
both on the border between empire and the north and in a labyrinth of 
influence that speaks in a language not wholly its own. Just as Kroetsch 
reveals the gaming and playful elements of the formal rituals of war and 
religion, his attention to game theory and explicit acts of gaming depict 
the place of the “borderland” (“Canadian Writer” 12) and the writer 
struggling with the “hopeless and necessary hope of originality” (“Fear” 
12) as elements of an unfolding postmodern godgame. Kroetsch’s texts 
are proto-gaming texts that not only predict the increased relevance 
of games and game theory in a range of social relationships but also 
employ games as a metaphor for the transformation of meaning and 
identity under the conditions of postmodernism. Games also function 
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as mechanisms that reveal the postmodern godgame at work in broader 
social spheres. Thus, Kroetsch’s application of game theory and game 
as metaphor and mechanism for depicting place, identity, history, and 
the writing process provides a new imaginative vocabulary for readers to 
conceive of their relationship to the text as ongoing, open to transforma-
tion, and never complete.
Notes
1 See, for instance, Randall (1989), Jackman (1991), and Whetter (1996). These rep-
resent, of course, only a sampling of the theoretical frameworks by which critics have 
attempted to decipher Kroetsch’s work. Discussions of postmodern play in Kroetsch’s work 
often begin by discussing his essay “For Play And Entrance: The Contemporary Canadian 
Long Poem,” a “seminal” (Djwa), cryptic, provocative, and unsettling commentary on the 
form of the Canadian long poem. What remains unconsidered in Kroetsch scholarship, 
however, is his attention not merely to play but also to games, particularly as they structure 
Kroetsch’s poetics and criticism.
2 Indeed, the neoliberal transformation of a number of social relationships into competi-
tive, cost-benefit calculations has expanded game theory’s domain. Nick Dyer-Witherford 
and Greig de Peuter have recently argued that “virtual games are media constitutive of 
twenty-first-century global hypercapitalism and, perhaps, also of lines of exodus from it” 
(xxix).
3 Zygmunt Bauman, for instance, insists that “The mark of postmodern adulthood is the 
willingness to embrace the game whole-heartedly, as children do” (99). 
4 See Howard (1971) and O’Neill (1991).
5 Brams argues that “a number of conflicts in the literary works I assay can be viewed as 
zero-sum, in which what one player wins the other players lose. If there are only two players, 
the . . . minimax theorem . . . established that there is always a solution that guarantees the 
players at least a particular value, whatever the opponent does” (5). He proceeds to analyze 
a number of literary texts as zero-sum and strategic games. For instance, he posits that the 
story of Abraham and Isaac can be conceived as a game in which “Abraham has two strat-
egy choices: 1. Offer Isaac 2. Don’t offer Isaac. God, in turn has two strategy choices: 1. 
Renege (if Abraham offers) / relent (if not) 2. Don’t renege / relent.” (34). Brams develops 
an outcome matrix and decision tree that maps out the optimal decisions for both Abraham 
and God: “If rational then, Abraham will [sacrifice Isaac, resulting] . . . in both players 
obtaining their mutually best outcome. . . . This outcome, associated with the dominant 
strategy of God and the best response to it by Abraham, leads to a Nash equilibrium, or 
an outcome from which neither player would depart unilaterally because he or she would 
do worse doing so” (39). Brams offers a similar analysis of Hamlet as a game of incomplete 
information, showing that “Hamlet’s apparent dithering is less a tragic flaw in his character 
than a rational response within a game in which sketchy information had first to be filled 
in and verified before a rational course of action could be plotted and then taken” (210).
6 Kroetsch’s differentiation between a picture theory of language and language 
games evokes Wittgenstein’s critique of Augustine’s conception of language as referential. 
Wittgenstein begins Philosophical Investigations with a quote from Augustine, about which 
he comments, “In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every 
110 Scl/Élc
word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which 
the word stands” (2). Wittgenstein critiques this referential theory of language, investigat-
ing, through language-games and other methods, instances in which the referential theory 
of language fails.
7 While Wittgenstein refers to language games throughout Philosophical Investigations, 
it is perhaps part of his refusal of an ur-theory of language that he never precisely defines 
language game. He writes, “Don’t say: ‘There must be something common, or they would 
not be called “games”’ — but look and see whether there is something common to all. For if 
you look at them, you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, rela-
tionships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look! . . . we see a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (32). It is in the specific 
examination of particular games and particular examples of language that Wittgenstein 
is able to demonstrate the “complicated network of similarities” between language and 
games. As David G. Stern argues, “Wittgenstein is not claiming that language is nothing 
more than a game, or that we can change our language as easily as we can change a game. 
Rather, he is advocating a close comparison between language and games, a comparison that 
can help us see aspects of our use of language — in connection with activity, its diversity, 
and the role of rules — that are often obscured by other approaches” (90). Marie McGinn 
agrees, arguing that “instead of approaching language as a system of signs with meaning, 
we are prompted to think about it in situ, embedded in the lives of those who speak it” 
(44). Kroetsch’s conception of “ language as a serious game” obscures Wittgenstein’s notion 
of language games, and in Labyrinths, Kroetsch seems to be identifying language as a game 
in Huizinga’s sense of the term while using Wittgenstein’s terminology. 
8 Kroetsch himself explicitly describes his interest in Bakhtin’s work in “Carnival and 
Violence: A Meditation.”
9 Indeed, Bakhtin’s inventory of the functions of the carnival-grotesque reads like a 
description of much of Kroetsch’s work: “to consecrate inventive freedom, to permit the 
combination of a variety of different elements and their rapprochement, to liberate from 
the prevailing point of view of the world, from conventions and established truths, from 
clichés, from all that is humdrum and universally accepted” (34).
10 It is worth noting that Bakhtin differentiates between the “utopian” space of the 
carnival and the imitation of the “official feast.” He writes, “As opposed to the official 
feast, . . . carnival celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from 
the established order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, 
and prohibitions. Carnival was the true feast of time, the feast of becoming, change, and 
renewal. It was hostile to all that was immortalized and completed” (10). Reading Kroetsch 
via Bakhtin requires differentiating between the official feast and the carnival. 
11 Aritha van Herk observes that “the quest here is that of the aroused male repeating 
himself endlessly” and that “Hazard Lepage is trickster embodied, the studhorse man ped-
dling lust and horseflesh at the same time” (“Biocritical”). Hazard’s desire drives the plot 
yet his desire, like Poseidon’s, is repeatedly delayed in a manner that parallels the delay that 
Kroetsch identifies in the Canadian long poem. While it is beyond the scope of this essay, 
the connections between desire and gaming fuel Hazard’s attempts to breed Poseidon, 
Demeter Proudfoot’s struggle to narrate Hazard’s life, and the labyrinths of meaning in 
which author and reader play.
12 Toward the end of the novel, for instance, a group of hunters tracking coyotes turns 
on Hazard and his companion Utter. Demeter describes the coyote hunt wherein “frantic 
animals were shot or at least shot at with shotguns amid great excitement and hilarity. . . . 
[The hunters] were all well equipped with lethal weapons, and they delighted in anything 
that enabled them to pretend at waging war” (117). Once again the narrative establishes a 
continuity between the raucous pretending of the game and the violence of war. This is one 
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of many instances in the novel where pretending suddenly becomes serious and the space 
between the game and “serious” life is blurred.
13 In his “Towards an Essay: My Upstate New York Journals,” Kroetsch reveals that his 
original title for Gone Indian was Funeral Games. This alternative title suggests the manner 
in which Mark Madham’s manipulations of the fragments of Jeremy Sadness’s narrative take 
the form of a game for which neither reader nor Madham knows the rules.
14 I am thankful to the second anonymous reviewer of this article for this observation.
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